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Abstract 
The traditional interest rate policy has lost its potency due to the zero-lower bound of nominal 
interest rates and the gradual accelerating deflation in Japan.  Without stopping deflation, the 
Japanese government may face a rapid erosion of credit worthiness due to an uncontrolled 
budget deficit.  In order to cope with this unusual situation, a non-traditional monetary policy 
measure is proposed. A negative nominal interest rate is needed to clear Japanese markets and 
can be achieved by levying a tax on all the government-guaranteed yen financial assets.  This 
is a modified version of Gesell’s stamp duty on currency for actual implementation in the 
contemporary context.    The benefits and side effects of this tax for Japan are analyzed here. 
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“As the owners of goods are always in a hurry for exchange, it is only just and fair that the 
owners of money, which is the medium of exchange, should also be in a hurry.  Supply is 
under an immediate, inherent constraint; therefore demand must be placed under the same 
constraint.” 
Silvio Gesell, The Natural Economic Order, 1906. 
1. INTRODUCTION 
Since short-term interest rates are already zero, conventional monetary policy tools have 
lost their effectiveness.  Thus, a potent monetary policy weapon, an open market purchase of 
short-term government paper by the Bank of Japan (BOJ), is no-longer effective because base 
money and zero-interest short-term government paper are perfect substitutes under a 
zero-interest rate regime.  Long-term bond yields have fallen to extremely low levels; about 
1.5 percent for 10-year JGBs (Japanese Government Bonds) at the time of writing of this paper.   
Since the yields on long-term bonds reflect the large downside risk of bond prices as well as the 
expected future path of short-term interest rates, a further injection of base money is not likely 
to push down long-term rates further.  The Ministry of Finance (MOF) has already been 
issuing massive amounts of zero-interest short-term notes.  Since such short-term notes are a 
perfect substitute for base money under a zero interest-rate policy, the MOF is effectively 
injecting a large amount of near base money without much effect. 
Some economists have argued that the Bank of Japan can lower long-term interest rates 
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further by buying all the outstanding JGBs.
2 If the Bank literally buys all the JGBs, the 
government bond market will disappear and it will no longer be possible to observe market 
yields of JGBs.    However, private bond and lending markets will remain open and the interest 
rates on private bonds will be determined in such markets.  The disappearance of JGBs will 
marginally reduce private bond yields, but the long-term interest rate on private bonds is not 
likely to fall much given the large downside risk of bond prices.    If the Bank also buys private 
bonds at lower-than-market yields, the Bank will effectively provide subsidies to some of the 
private borrowers and such operations should be regarded as an unconventional monetary policy.   
In order to affect private spending, it is necessary to reduce interest rates on private borrowings 
in the financial market. 
Since the spring of 2003, the Japanese economy has shown some recovery.    Real GDP 
grew almost 4 percent in fiscal 2003 and the deflationary gap has shrunk considerably.  
Corporate profits, private investments and the employment situations have shown a steady 
recovery.  However, the GDP deflator is still falling by about 1.5 percent per annum and has 
not shown any signs of improvement yet at the time of writing (January 2005).  Given the 
estimated potential growth rate of 1.5 percent, the Japanese economy still faces a risk again of a 
negative nominal growth in the near future.
3  In such a situation, Japanese government cannot 
reduce its massive budget deficits and it will gradually lose public confidence on its financial 
health.  The youth unemployment problem is also likely to continue and it will destroy the 
valuable human capital for the future. 
If the Japanese economy cannot exit from continuing deflation under the current 
recovery, it is necessary to implement a very strong expansionary policy to achieve a positive 
inflation rate without increasing budget deficits.
4  In order to get out of this deflationary trap, 
                                                  
2  Willem Buiter suggested such policy in his comment on an earlier draft of this paper. 
3  See Fukao (2003) for an estimation of the potential GDP growth rate. 
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policy makers because the monetization of public debt is a clear policy option.  Unfortunately, we 
cannot safely forget about the money created by the monetization of national debts forever.  When the 




the Japanese government and BOJ have to implement a non-traditional monetary policy.  My 
proposals are as follows.  First the government should set and announce to the public a target 
for price stability (inflation target).  The target inflation rate should be about 1.5 percent par 
annum measured by the core consumer price index, and the margin of error should be plus or 
minus 1 percent per year over a three-year horizon.  To achieve this target, laws must be 
revised to allow BOJ to buy all securities, not just bonds, for its open market operation, and 
purchase real assets such as TOPIX
5 based mutual funds and REITs
6 up to a few trillion yen 
per month.    This should stop the asset price deflation in the short run.    However, the effect on 
prices of goods and services is not certain.    If this open market purchase of real asset does not 
stop deflation of goods and services, asset price deflation will start again.  In this event, the 
interest rate should be made “negative” by taxing the balance of all government-backed 
financial assets such as bank deposits, government bonds, postal savings, cash, etc., at the rate 
that is slightly higher than the deflation rate until deflation is stopped.    This policy is similar to 
Silvio Gesell’s stamp duty on currency first proposed in Gesell (1906). 
In order to levy a tax on cash, the BOJ should introduce new banknotes and charge fees 
for exchange with old notes.    In times of deflation, people are increasing their holdings of cash 
and bank deposits, because doing so is safest and best in portfolio management.  We should 
encourage investments in stocks and real estate by taxing cash and bank deposits.  The 
negative interest rate policy is expected to decrease savings and stimulate investment.  The 
total revenue for the government with a 2-percent tax would amount to about 30 trillion yen or 
six percent of GDP.  While such a novel tax might cause some confusion, the government 
could make use of the tax revenue to reduce its budget deficit, re-capitalize deposit insurance 
funds and/or improve its anti-unemployment policy.   
Once deflation is overcome, the nominal interest rate would rise, possibly causing the 
                                                                                                                                                  
to sell most of the purchased bonds to absorb excessive base money.  Otherwise, the Bank has to allow 
general prices to raise about 2000 percent to increase the transaction demand for base money.  See 
Figure 6. 
5  TOPIX is a market capitalization based stock-price index of the Tokyo Stock Exchange. 




bankruptcies of corporations with excess debts and the failures of banks and life insurance 
companies due to sharp falls in bond prices.    In consequence, precautions for risk management 
are needed.  Without overcoming deflation and experiencing the pain associated with the end 
of deflation, the Japanese economy may continue to suffer from a stagnant economy. 
2. GRADUALLY ACCELERATING DEFLATION 
Deflation in Japan is steadily continuing.  Figure 1 shows the GDP deflator and core 
CPI since 1981. Note that a 3 percent consumption tax was introduced in April 1989, and that 
this tax rate was raised again by 2 points to 5 percent in April 1997.    As a result, the two price 
indices are biased upwards in these years.  The core CPI started to fall in 1998 and the GDP 
deflator started to fall in 1995.  The GDP deflator deflation rate has been larger than the CPI 
because the upward bias of CPI is more pronounced than that of the deflator.  By the end of 
2003, the GDP deflator deflation rate is about 1.5 percent and still declining.  Figure 2 shows 
that the general price level measured by the GDP deflator has fallen by about 10 percent from 
the peak in early 1994 to mid-2004. 
While the public discussions of monetary policy and deflation generally focus on CPI, 
the movement of the GDP deflator is more important for the health of the Japanese economy.  
Corporate profits and labor income depend on the nominal GDP that is the product of the GDP 
deflator and real GDP.    Tax revenue is also dependent on nominal GDP.    The gap between the 
CPI and GDP deflator has been widening in the 1990s, and the average gap is 0.9 percent over 
the past five years (1999-2003).  This means that even if the Bank of Japan can stabilize the 
CPI at zero inflation, the GDP deflator will be falling at 0.9 percent.  Therefore, in this paper, 
we focus on the GDP deflator deflation rate. 
BOJ has pointed out that the GDP deflator exaggerates the rate of deflation due to the 
very rapid fall in computer prices and the Paasche index bias.  Partly due to this criticism, the 
government changed the formula for the GDP deflator from a Paasche index to a chain-weight 
index in December 2004.    Because of this change, the GDP deflator deflation rate was revised 
from about 2.5 percent to 1.5 percent in 2004.  The revision was not so large or one-sided for 
the data until the end of 2002.    On the other hand, the revision has been 0.9 to 1.3 points since 




nominal figures much.  As a result, the real growth rate has been revised downwards since 
2003 by about 1 point. 
In this context, we should note that the BOJ paper does not mention the possible 
upward bias in the GDP deflator.  Because most price indices do not take account of quality 
changes in goods and services, the GDP deflator does have some upward bias from this source.     
The deceleration of inflation in the first half of 1990 and the acceleration of the 
deflation rate in the second half of the decade strongly suggest that Japan has maintained a 
deflationary GDP gap since the collapse of the bubble economy in the late 1980s.  In Fukao 
(2003), with the help of the Financial Study Group of the Japan Center for Economic Research, 
I estimated the size of the GDP gap based on the conventional production function approach 
with an estimated Phillips curve.     
Figure 3 shows the estimated GDP gap with the GDP deflator inflation rate.  Since 
SAAR (seasonally adjusted annual rate) data are highly erratic, I used a three-quarter moving 
average of SAAR series.  The GDP gap peaked at 2.3% in 1990 and then started to fall.  It 
became negative in mid 1992 and the deflationary environment has continued since then.    The 
gap narrowed to zero in early 1997 when the planned increase of the VAT stimulated 
consumption on consumer durables and housing.  However, the gap became very large by 
mid-1999 due mainly to the financial crisis form the fall of 1997 until early 1999.  Although 
capital injection and the cyclical recovery briefly narrowed the gap in 2000, the Japanese 
economy fell into a deeper trough in 2002, with the deflationary gap reaching 6.9 percent of the 
natural level of GDP in the first quarter of 2002.    Since then, the Japanese economy recovered 
slowly until mid-2003 and the growth rate was relatively high until early 2004 (Figure 4).    By 
mid-2004, the GDP gap had declined to about 2.8 percent.  In spite of this recovery, the GDP 
deflator deflation rate has not improved yet and it continues to decline by about 1.5 percent a 
year. 
The continuing deflation has caused various problems.  Keynes (1924, 1936) and 
Fisher (1933) documented the negative effects of deflation on economic activities.  Since the 
downward adjustments of wages are often slower than the downward price adjustments of 




debt of the enterprise sector has risen.    The declining profit and the increasing value of the debt 
tend to depress business activities and raise unemployment.    Under a deflationary environment, 
asset prices decline more sharply than those of goods and services because asset prices reflect 
the expected decline of future cash flows from investments.  These factors also contribute to 
the deterioration of the asset quality of financial institutions and depress lending activities.
7 
3.  MACRO-ECONOMIC  POLICY  UNDER  LARGE  GDP  GAP                       
AND ZERO-INTEREST RATE 
The BOJ is providing a large amount of monetary base, but the broadly defined money 
supply is not increasing much (Figure 5).    As short-term interest rates moved close to zero, the 
monetary base was hoarded by banks and short-term money market dealers and was held as 
current deposits at the BOJ.  Figure 6 shows a phase diagram of the monetary base and 
nominal short-term interest rates since 1980, and it can be regarded as an empirical demand 
function for the monetary base.
8  When the short-term nominal interest rate was between 1 to 
12 percent, the monetary base-GDP ratio moved between 7 to 9 percent.  However, when the 
short-term interest rate reached 0.5 percent in the summer of 1995, the demand for monetary 
base became very elastic.  The monetary base-GDP ratio increased to 11 percent when the 
zero-interest rate policy was adopted in February 1999.  From the start of the quantitative 
easing in March 2001 until the end of 2003, the ratio increased from 12.5 percent to 21 percent.   
The flat part of Figure 6 clearly shows that the Japanese economy has been in a liquidity trap. 
Figure 7 shows the reaction function of the BOJ in the face of a falling inflation rate.  
The overnight call rate was reduced in line with the GDP deflator inflation rate.  A one point 
fall in the deflation rate induced the Bank of Japan to cut the nominal rate by 1.8 points, thereby 
reducing the real interest rate by 0.8 points.    The BOJ ran out of room for maneuver when the 
                                                  
7  Andrew Coleman has suggested that the author document the negative effects from deflation. 
8 This Figure also implies that the general price level has to rise dramatically if the BOJ does not absorb 
the monetary base in the face of rising prices.  In order to increase the demand for base money to the 
actual level at the end of 2003, prices have to rise by about 150 percent.  If the BOJ monetizes all the 
government debts amounting to 170 percent of GDP, the general price level will be about 20 times higher 





deflation rate fell to minus 1.23 percent (1.23=2.22/1.81).  The Bank faced the zero lower 
bound of the nominal interest rate.    If the BOJ could have used a negative policy interest rate, 
it would have set its policy interest rate at minus 0.5 percent under the 1.5 percent GDP deflator 
deflation rate that was reached in the first half of 2004. 
In spite of the aggressive increase in the monetary base, real interest rates have risen 
somewhat from the trough of mid 1998.  Figure 8 shows nominal and real interest rates since 
1986, together with the average new lending rate of all banks and over-night call rates.  The 
call rate indicates the short-term interest rates for high-quality borrower, while the average new 
lending rate indicates the borrowing costs for small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs).  
Nominal rates are shown in dotted lines and the real rates in solid lines.  While the real and 
nominal interest rates fell until 1998, the real rates rose somewhat because of the acceleration of 
deflation.   
We have to pay attention to the fact that the gap between the lending rates and the call 
rate gradually increased in the 1990s.    In the 1980s, the difference between the lending rate and 
the call rate was very small, less than 50 base points.  By the mid 1990s, the gap increased to 
over 150 base points.    The increasing gap is the result of the decontrol on deposit interest rates 
and the declining market interest rates towards zero.    Banks lost regulatory rent from regulated 
deposits in the early 1990s.  As the market rates fell towards zero in the 1990s, banks had to 
raise loan rates to maintain profit margins.  The real new lending rate is about 3 percent and 
close to the booming bubble period in the late 1980s.  Even the real call rate is about 1.5 
percent, which is higher than the real short-term market rate in United States.  The high real 
cost of funding for SMEs is depressing economic activity. 
Japan may be on the verge of entering a deflationary trap.  A further increase in the 
real interest rates due to deflation may depress the economy.    The depressed economy, in turn, 
may accelerate deflation, and the real interest rates may rise further as a result.  An open 
market purchase of long-term government bonds is only marginally effective because long-term 
interest rates are already extremely low, and the BOJ cannot push down long-term rates in any 
significant amount. 




stimulate the economy.  Table 1 shows the budgetary situation of the general government of 
Japan that includes the central government, local government, and the social security fund.  
The debt-GDP ratio was already 158 percent at the end of 2003.  With an extremely large 
budget deficit and declining nominal GDP, this ratio is likely to increase by 8 points a year.  
The gross debt of the general government will reach 200 percent by 2008.  Moreover, these 
figures do not include off-balance-sheet liabilities such as the failing national pension system 
and loss-making government owned companies. 
At the time of writing (January 2005), the Japanese yen government bond (JGB) is rated 
AA- by Standard & Poor’s and A2 by Moody’s.  These are the lowest ratings among major 
countries.  If the Japanese government cannot stabilize the macro economy by stopping 
deflation, the JGB will be downgraded further.    In that event, the government will have to shift 
its funding from long-term bonds to short-term notes so as to reduce interest costs.  However, 
the shortening maturity of JGB will increase the funding vulnerability to a sharp rise in interest 
rates.  Such downgrading of the government bonds would adversely affect the international 
operations of private financial institutions and corporations. 
Furthermore, even a mild capital flight from Japan could lead to fiscal crisis.  If the 
Japanese household sector shifts six percent of the 1400 trillion yen gross financial assets from 
the yen to foreign currencies, it would wipe out all of the 820 billion US dollar foreign 
exchange reserve of Japan.  A capital flight from Japan might cure its deflation with a sharp 
devaluation of the yen.  However, the exit of Japan from deflation may trigger a budgetary 
crisis if it comes too late.
9  Suppose that Japan already has 200 percent gross debt mostly 
financed by short-term liabilities.    Since most of its gross assets are invested in long-term fixed 
interest assets, the government cannot count on higher interest income in the short run under 
increasing interest rates.  A 5 percent rise in the interest rate will increase the annual net 
interest payments by 10 percent of GDP or 50 trillion yen in two years.  This figure is more 
than the size of the total national government tax revenue excluding social security 
                                                  
9  A capital flight is less damaging for creditor countries than for debtor countries.  A depreciation of 
the domestic currency usually generates capital gains for creditors and capital losses for debtors.  Since 






One possible scenario is shown in Table 2.  As budget deficits continue, a large 
amount of short-term government liabilities are accumulated.  As the weak links of the 
government such as some local governments and government sponsored companies may fail, 
Japanese investors will gradually lose confidence in the Japanese government and start to shift 
assets to foreign currencies and real assets.  The yen may start to depreciate sharply, beyond 
200 yen per US dollar, and other Asian countries may also devalue their currencies against the 
US dollar and the euro in the face of increased competitive pressures from Japan.    With a deep 
devaluation of the yen the Japanese economy will get out of deflation.  The BOJ may start to 
raise short-term interest rates to stop the acceleration of inflation.  However, the Japanese 
government will face a massive increase in its debt service due to a shortened liability structure.   
The Japanese government may face a sharp down-grading of its credit ratings and interest rates 
may rise further.  In that event, the BOJ will be forced to print money to sustain the 
government.  In the meantime, the simultaneous devaluation of Asian currencies may even 
drag the United States into a deep recession.     
4. MONETARY POLICY TO OVERCOME DEFLATIONARY TRAP 
Given that the Japanese economy is experiencing an economic recovery, it might be 
able to get out of this deflation without strong policy measures.  However, if it cannot exit 
from deflation with this recovery, it may be necessary to apply a very strong policy package to 
get out form this deflationary trap before it is too late.  Since short-term interest rates are 
already zero, traditional monetary policy tools are no longer very effective.  In order to avoid 
prolonged stagnation and the rapid deterioration of the budgetary situations of the Japanese 
government, it is necessary then to implement non-traditional policy measures.  My proposals 
are as follows. 
1. Open Market Purchase of Real Assets 
First the BOJ should set and announce to the public a target for price stability (inflation 
                                                  




target) of around 1.5 percent of consumer price inflation plus/minus 1 percent per year for a 
three-year time horizon.    To achieve this target, laws must be amended to allow the BOJ to buy 
all securities, not just bonds, for its open market operation, and purchase real assets such as 
TOPIX based ETS (exchange-traded mutual funds) and REITs (real estate investment trusts) up 
to a few trillion yen per month.    Since the outstanding amounts of ETFs and REITs are only a 
few trillion yen, it would be necessary for the Bank to buy exchange-traded TOPIX futures until 
more funds are supplied.    This should stop the asset price deflation at least in the short-run. 
If this policy can change the expectations on future inflation rate to a positive number, 
the deflation is likely to stop.  However, if Japanese investors continue to buy government 
backed assets, the flow price deflation will continue.  Since asset prices are determined by 
underlying cash flows of profits and rents, they will also start to fall again.  Therefore, the 
open-market purchase of stocks and real estates is not a panacea and may fail to work. 
2. Negative Interest Rate Policy by Gesell Tax 
If the ETF and REIT operations do not stop deflation, then the interest rate has to be 
made “negative” by taxing the balances of all government-backed financial assets such as bank 
deposits, government bonds, postal savings, cash, etc., at a rate that is slightly higher than the 
deflation rate until deflation is stopped.  Investments should be encouraged in stocks and real 
estate by taxing cash and bank deposits.    The tax rate should be somewhat higher than the rate 
of deflation and the government should declare that the tax will be applied repeatedly as long as 
deflation continues. 
This tax is similar to the famous Silvio Gesell’s stamp-duty on currency.
11  Goodfriend 
(2000) has proposed to levy a carry-tax on cash as an effective measure to stop deflation.  
Details of my proposal are shown in Table 3.    While Gesell proposed to levy a tax only on cash, 
I am proposing to levy a tax on all government-guaranteed financial assets.  Instead of 
                                                  
11 Gesell proposed to levy a 0.1 percent stamp duty on bank notes every week.  The annual tax rate 
would be 5.1 percent of the face value.  At the end of the year, a note with 51 stamps would be 
exchanged for a new note.    See Gesell (1906), part IV.    This proposal is also described in chapter 23 of 




cumbersome stamp duty, I am proposing to charge fees to exchange old bank notes with new 
ones. 
The government has to levy a tax on the balance of all government guaranteed financial 
assets.  Taxable assets include all central and local government liabilities, all government 
guaranteed assets such as postal saving deposits and postal life insurance policies, and all yen 
liabilities of the banking sector.  In order to avoid tax loopholes, yen cash payments on 
derivative transactions by banks should also be taxed.    Finally, banknotes should be taxed.    In 
order to tax cash, the BOJ has to print new bank notes and levy fees for exchange.  
Alternatively, the government can levy a stamp duty on old bank notes. 
Buiter (2004) has argued that it is not necessary to levy a tax on all government 
guaranteed financial assets.  Instead, he proposed that the central bank should monetize all 
government debts, and a tax should be levied only on base money to avoid legal complications.   
However, Buiter’s procedure is possible only when nobody expects such a future tax.  If the 
private sector anticipates a new tax on base money, the market prices of non-taxable 
government assets will rise relative to the base money by the amount of the expected tax rate.  
Moreover, people will shift their portfolios away from the base money to near-monies such as 
treasury bills and bank deposits.  Therefore, we cannot avoid taxing all the government 
guaranteed financial assets to achieve the necessary expansionary effects from the Gesell tax. 
This tax will have very strong effects on expenditures.  Table 4 summaries the effects 
of this policy.    People will shift from “safe” assets to risky assets.    In other words, people will 
shift from taxable assets to all the non-taxable assets.  Since stocks, real estate, corporate 
bonds, foreign bonds, and consumer durables are not taxed, the demand for these assets will 
increase.  The yen exchange rate would also depreciate against foreign currencies.  This tax 
will also stimulate bank lending activities.  Banks will shift assets from BOJ deposits and 
government bonds to loans and corporate bonds.  Inter-corporate credit will also expand 
because receivables are not taxed but cash and deposit will be taxed. 
This tax will generate a large amount of revenue for the government.  The total tax 
revenue of 2 percent tax on the government guaranteed financial assets would amount to about 




revenue to reduce its budget deficit, re-capitalize deposit insurance funds, or improve its 
anti-unemployment policy. 
There are a number of negative side effects of this policy.  First, this tax may have a 
possible adverse effect on the credit rating of the Japanese government.    For example, Moody’s 
Investors Service states that an imposition of a tax on government liabilities may constitute an 
event of partial default by the government.
12  However, this is a relatively minor problem 
because only a small portion of JGB (about 3.6 percent at the end of 2003) is held by foreign 
investors.  Second, it will be very difficult to pass a new law to levy this tax.  New taxes are 
always opposed by the public.    One way to sweeten this medicine is to distribute cash to all the 
Japanese people.    A cash distribution of JPY 50,000 per person will offset the 2 percent tax on 
JPY 2,500,000.  The cost of this cash rebate is about JPY 6 trillion or one-fifth of the tax 
revenue.  Third, many financial institutions such as banks or life-insurance companies face a 
large tax bill because they hold large amounts of government bonds with liabilities of nominally 
fixed values.    One way to compensate these financial institutions is to reduce deposit insurance 
corporation fees and insurance policyholder protection organization fees.  By using a part of 
the tax revenue to fund these financial safety-net organizations, the government can provide 
financial relief to banks and life-insurance companies. 
Once deflation is overcome, conventional interest rate policy will become useful again.   
The BOJ can maintain relatively low real interest rates at the shorter end of the term structure.  
The environment for new business will improve.  Commercial banks can increase profit 
margins without raising real borrowing costs for customers.    Life insurance companies will be 
able to overcome negative carryover from old insurance contracts with high guaranteed rates.
13  
The big upward shifts in the expectations on the future price path will push up stock and real 
estate prices.  These changes in the financial market will make it much easier to resolve 
perennial non-performing loan problems in the banking sector. 
We also have to take note of the negative side effects of the exit from deflation.  The 
                                                  
12  On the other hand, Moody’s does not regard inflation, even hyper inflation, as an event of default even 
though the government is effectively reducing the real value of its debt. 




nominal long-term interest rate would rise considerably, causing bankruptcies of corporations 
with excess debts.  A number of weakened banks and life insurance companies may also fail 
due to the sharp fall in bond prices.  Therefore, we need to take sufficient precautions for risk 
management. 
5. CONCLUDING REMARKS 
In this paper, I have analyzed the causes of the persistent deflation in Japan.  It was 
found that deflation had accelerated from 1995 to 1999 and has remained at about 1.5 percent 
since then.  Because of the deflation, real interest rates are relatively high for the stagnant 
Japanese economy and conventional monetary policy tools are now much less potent.  I 
propose that the BOJ should buy large amounts of ETFs and REITs to fight against deflation.  
If this measure is not effective, the government should introduce a negative interest rate by 
levying a tax on all the government guaranteed financial assets. 
I do not propose a massive open-market purchase of long-term government bonds.  
This is because an excessive amount of open-market purchases may cripple the soundness of the 
BOJ.  Table 5 illustrates this problem.  Suppose the Bank bought one-half of the outstanding 
long-term government bonds held by the private sector, 150 trillion yen of JGBs, on top of the 
portfolio of March 2004, and it increased the current deposits held by banks.  Suppose further 
that Japan finally gets out of deflation and the long-term market rates rise to 5 percent.    A four 
percentage point rise in the long-term rate will reduce the market value of 10-year JGB by 
almost 30 percent.  Once the deflation ends, the BOJ has to raise short-term interest rates by 
mopping up excess liquidity in the short-term money market.    As seen in Figure 6, the demand 
for monetary base is about 8 percent of GDP when nominal rates are about 3 to 4 percent and 
the Bank has to reduce the monetary base to this level.  However, the BOJ will run out of 
saleable assets due to the capital loss in its long-term bonds.  As shown in Table 5, the Bank 
will be forced to issue interest-bearing promissory notes to raise short-term rates from zero. The 
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 Figure 1
GDP Deflator and CPI (Yearly Change)




























































GDP Deflator Price Level (Unadjusted 1995=1.0)
        
Note: Adjusted for changes in consumption tax in April 1989 and April 1997.














































































































GDP Gap and GDP Deflator
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GDP Growth Rate
Annual Rate after 3-Quarter Moving Average











































































































Real GDP Nominal GDPFigure 5
Money Supply Developments
Yearly change in percent

























































































































































Note:  The phase diagram plots the nominal- overnight call-money interest  rate and the base money-GDP ratio.Figure 7
Inflation and Short-term Money Rate (1981/Q1-2004/Q3)
OLS regression 1991/1-1999/1
Period: before zero-interest rate policy
r = 2.225 + 1.814 x pi + e R2 = 0.89
    (16.0)     (15.7) F   = 255.2
SE = 0.82
r:   Overnight call rate
pi: GDP deflator inflation rate
e:  Error term
Real interest rate reaction function
r - pi = 2.225 + 0.814 x pi
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Note: Real Interest Rates are estimated with 3Q moving average of GDP deflator inflation rate (SAAR).





Projection on General Government Budget Deficits
Year Nominal Primary Balance General Government General Government Effective Interest Net Interest Cost
GDP Growth GDP Ratio Gross Debt Net Debt Rate on Net Debt GDP Ratio
Rate GDP Ratio GDP Ratio
1999 -1.4 -5.8 120.4 36.0 3.5 1.3
2000 0.8 -6.1 130.7 43.5 3.1 1.3
2001 -1.1 -4.7 142.0 51.0 2.8 1.4
2002 -1.5 -6.0 150.2 59.2 2.1 1.2
2003 0.1 -6.3 157.6 66.6 2.1 1.4
2004 0.0 -6.3 165.3 74.3 2.1 1.6
2005 0.0 -6.3 173.2 82.2 2.3 1.9
2006 0.0 -6.3 181.4 90.4 2.7 2.4
2007 0.0 -6.3 190.1 99.1 3.0 3.0
2008 0.0 -6.3 199.4 108.4 4.0 4.3
2009 0.0 -6.3 210.0 119.0 4.0 4.8
Note: Figures until 2003 are based on IMF, World Economic Outlook and OECD, Economic Outlook.
　　  General government gross assets are assumed to be constant after 2002.
         Sharp downgradings of JGB are assumed after 2006.
Source: Prepared by the author.Table 2
Capital Flight Scenario
1.  Large amounts of short-term government liabilities are accumulated.
2. Japanese investors lose confidence in the Japanese government
3. Investors start to shift assets to foreign currencies.
4. Yen starts to fall sharply and other Asian countries start to devalue
    their currencies against the US dollar and the euro.
5. Japanese economy gets out of deflation. and the BOJ tries to
    raise interest rates to stop the acceleration of inflation.
6. Japanese government will face a massive increase in its debt
    service due to shortened liability structure.
7. Japanese government will face a sharp down-grading of credit
    ratings and interest rates will rise further.
8. The BOJ will be forced to print money to sustain the government.
Source: Prepared by the author.Table 3
Proposed Gesell Tax on Government Guaranteed Assets
1. Levy tax on all  government guaranteed financial assets.
    Tax is levied on the balance of the asset.
    Tax rate should be somewhat higher than the rate of deflation.
    Tax has to be levied repeatedly as long as deflation continues.
2. Taxable assets are as follows:
    All central and local government liabilities.
      Central and local government bonds and other liabilities.
    All yen liabilities of the banking sector.
      Yen cash payments on derivative transactions are taxable.
    Postal saving and postal life-insurance policies.
    Cash (BOJ notes)
3. Taxation on cash
    The BOJ has to print new bank notes and levy fees for 
    exchange.
    Alternatively, levy  stamp duty on old bank notes.
Source: Prepared by the author.Table 4
Effects of Gesell Tax
1. Asset substitution
    People shift assets from "safe" assets to risky assets.
      From taxable assets to all non-taxable assets, which include:
      Stocks, real estate, corporate bonds, foreign bonds,  and
      consumer durables.
    Stock and real estate prices will rise.
    The yen will depreciate against foreign currencies.
 
2. Credit expansion
    Banks will shift assets from BOJ deposits and government bonds
    to loans and corporate bonds.
    Inter-corporate credit will also expand because cash will be taxed.
3. Expectations effects
    The expected real return on cash and government guaranteed 
    deposit will decline because of the cost of taxation.
Source: Prepared by the author.Table 5
Massive Long-Term Bond Purchase and the Bank of Japan Balance Sheet
           The Bank purchases 150 trillion yen of 10 year JGB
Long-term bonds 216 Bank notes 71
Short-term notes 62 Current deposits 186
Other assets 21 Other liabilities 39
Net assets 3
Total 299 Total 299
Long-term bonds 151 Bank notes 71
Short-term notes 62 Current deposits 186
Other assets 35 Other liabilities 39
Net assets -48
Total 248 Total 248
Long-term bonds 0 Bank notes 35
Short-term notes 0 Current deposits 5
Other assets Other liabilities
  Gold, real estate   Bills sold 13
  and foreign assets 5 Net assets -48
Total 5 Total 5
Source: Prepared by the author.
150 trillion yen of long-term bonds and the same amount of current
After the Exit from Deflation
Before the Exit from Deflation
of its assets.
lose 30% of the value
deposits are added to March 2004 figures
The long-term interest rate rises by 5 points and long-term bonds
The BOJ absorbs the excess liquidity by open-market sales of its8 Reserve Supply and Short-term Market Rate (Jan 1994-April 2004)
Note: The reserves held by financial institututions that are required to hold reserves at the Bank of Japan are counted  as 
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